Probation, Privatisation and Legitimacy by Robinson, G et al.
 Robinson, G, Burke, L and Millings, MN
 Probation, Privatisation and Legitimacy
http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/6197/
Article
LJMU has developed LJMU Research Online for users to access the research output of the 
University more effectively. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by 
the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of 
any article(s) in LJMU Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or 
any commercial gain.
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of the record. 
Please see the repository URL above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
For more information please contact researchonline@ljmu.ac.uk
http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/
Citation (please note it is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you 
intend to cite from this work) 
Robinson, G, Burke, L and Millings, MN (2017) Probation, Privatisation and 
Legitimacy. Howard Journal of Criminal Justice. ISSN 0265-5527 
LJMU Research Online
1 
 
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: ‘Probation, Privatisation and 
Legitimacy’ ROBINSON, G., BURKE, L. and MILLINGS, M. (2017) which has been 
published in final form at 10.1111/hojo.12198. This article may be used for non-
commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving." 
 
 
Probation, Privatisation and Legitimacy 
Gwen Robinson (University of Sheffield), Lol Burke (Liverpool John Moores University) 
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Abstract: This article considers the recent partial privatisation of probation services in 
England and Wales from the theoretical perspective of legitimacy. Drawing in particular 
on Beethamǯs ȋ1991Ȍ work, we argue that the question of legitimacy in respect of 
privatised probation services is a complex one which requires attention to the multiple – 
and different – perspectives of key stakeholders or constituencies in the probation field. We 
argue that in the probation context there are five key stakeholder groups: the general 
public; offenders and victims; ministers and civil servants; sentencers; and probation 
employees and their representatives. We consider what is known about the perspectives of 
each of these groups in turn, before concluding that privatised probation services need to 
be aware of both the legitimacy deficits they face and the complex dynamics likely to be 
involved in its cultivation with these different constituencies. 
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Introduction 
Legitimacy has been described as a vexing concept (Ansell 2001) but it is also one which 
is increasingly being recognised as important in the criminological field. More than 
twenty years ago Richard Sparks suggested that legitimacy was ǲan issue for every practice of punishment or sanctioningǳ and one which ǲdelimits in very large measure the very arena within which penological debate must take placeǳ (1994: 16, 26). Since 
then, criminological research on legitimacy has predominantly centred on policing (e.g. 
Tyler 2006; Hough 2007; Bradford et al 2014), though there has been some engagement 
with legitimacy in studies of imprisonment (e.g. Sparks et al 1996; Liebling 2004; Crewe 
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2007); the criminal courts (Shute et al. 2005); and penal policies (Bottoms 2003; 
Snacken 2013). Meanwhile, in the probation field, questions of legitimacy have received 
scant attention (though see Digard 2010; McNeill and Robinson 2013; Irwin Rogers 
2015) and, to date, have not been brought explicitly to bear on the dramatic 
reconfiguration of probation services which occurred in June 2014 under the Coalition Governmentǯs Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) reform programme (MoJ 2013a, 2013b).  
The TR programme has entailed the replacement of the 35 English and Welsh public 
sector Probation Trusts by a new National Probation Service (NPS) responsible for the 
supervision of high risk offenders, and 21 new Community Rehabilitation Companies 
(CRCs) responsible for the supervision of medium and low risk offenders. Both the NPS 
and CRCs are new organisational entities in the criminal justice field, but whilst the NPS 
remains in the public sector, contracts to run the 21 CRCs have been awarded to eight 
new providers, seven of which are private sector companies or partnerships led by 
private sector interestsi. CRCs are now responsible for the lionǯs share of offender 
management work: the National Audit Office estimates that around 80% of new cases 
are allocated to CRCs, and that in July 2015 they managed some 61% of the 243,000 
offenders under supervision (NAO 2016).  
This significant step toward the outsourcing of criminal justice services has received 
remarkably little attention from the media (Phillips 2014; Hedderman & Murphy 2015) 
or from scholars beyond the probation field; yet it is a move that is deserving of serious 
critical attention, and which coincides with growing academic interest in the 
outsourcing of other aspects of criminal justice, most notably policing (e.g. White 2014; 
Lea & King, forthcoming; Lister & Hucklesby, forthcoming). This article thus aims to 
contribute to critical scholarship in the probation field, but also to inspire further 
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attention to the dynamics of legitimacy in other criminal justice contexts, particularly 
those affected by outsourcing.  
In this article it is argued that the question of legitimacy in respect of privatised 
probation services is a complex one which requires attention to the multiple, and 
different, perspectives of key stakeholders in the probation field. The article begins by 
setting up a theoretical framework for thinking about legitimacy which draws in particular on Beethamǯs ȋʹͲͲͳȌ work but also looks to the literature on organisational 
legitimacy for useful resources. This framework suggests that legitimacy is best 
understood as a social process: a product of the evaluations of social audiences or 
constituencies who may bring different norms, values and expectations to bear on their 
judgements. The article goes on to consider the main constituencies who are implicated in an analysis of the legitimacy of probation work. )nspired by Rod Morganǯs ȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍ 
reflections on the main users and beneficiaries of probation work, it is argued that these 
include: the general public, offenders and victims, ministers and civil servants, and 
sentencers. However, we contend that there is another important constituency which 
merits consideration: that of probation employees and their representatives, who have 
tended to be ignored in discussions of legitimacy in criminal justice contexts. In the 
remainder of the article we consider the perspectives of each of these five groups in turn, with reference to extant evidence from or own and othersǯ empirical researchii and 
from a variety of recent reports from sources including the National Audit Office and 
HM Inspectorate of Probation. We argue that the legitimacy of privatised probation 
services cannot be determined in any objective sense: legitimacy is a social construct 
and thus subject to fluctuations over time as well as differences of perspective. 
Nonetheless, we argue that CRCs clearly have legitimation work to do, and need to be 
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aware of both the legitimacy deficits they face and the complex dynamics likely to be 
involved in its cultivation. 
Legitimacy and the probation field: a theoretical framework  
)n common with many objects of social science, Ǯlegitimacyǯ is a contested concept: no 
single or agreed definition exists. Beetham (1991) explains that this is largely explicable 
due to the variety of professional/academic groups sharing an interest in the subject, 
each approaching it from a slightly different perspective. Beetham identifies three main 
groups, each with their own Ǯtakeǯ on legitimacy. For legal experts, he argues, legitimacy 
is equivalent to legal validity: power is legitimate to the extent that its acquisition and 
exercise conform to established legal rules. For moral and political philosophers, 
however, power can only be regarded as legitimate when the legal rules underpinning it 
conform to moral or political principles that are rationally defensible. In other words, 
legitimacy from this perspective is that which is morally justifiable or rightful. Finally, 
for the social scientist, interest lies principally in attempting to explain why people 
comply with, obey or disobey rules, or more broadly accept relations of power in 
particular contexts. For Beetham, each of these three dimensions of legitimacy is 
important and contributes to a full understanding of the concept. Power, he argues, is 
legitimate to the extent that: (i) it conforms to established rules; (ii) the rules can be 
justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate groups; and 
(iii) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relations ȋͳͻͻͳ: ͳ͸Ȍ. There are thus, for Beetham, three levels or dimensions of legitimacy, ǲeach 
of which provides moral grounds for compliance or cooperation on the part of those 
subordinate to a given power relationǳ ȋͳͻͻͳ: ʹͲȌ. For power to be legitimate, Beetham 
argues, all three conditions must be met.  
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Beetham acknowledges however that the extent to which these conditions will be 
realised in any given context will be a matter of degree: 
Every power relation knows its breaches of the rules or conventions; in any 
society there will be some people who do not accept the norms underpinning the 
rules of power, and some who refuse to express their consent, or who do so only 
under manifest duress. What matters is how widespread these deviations are, 
and how substantial in relation to the underlying norms and conventions that 
determine the legitimacy of power in a given context (1991: 20). 
Legitimacy then ǲis not an all-or-nothing affair […] [it] may be eroded, contested or incompleteǳ ȋBeetham ͳͻͻͳ: ͳͻ-ʹͲȌ. Beethamǯs approach also emphasises the 
subjective nature of legitimacy: it is not an objective feature of social entities but rather 
one which must be earned and endowed by relevant individuals or groups. To put this 
another way, legitimacy is best understood as a social process: a product of evaluation or Ǯcognitive construalǯ ȋJohnson et al. ʹͲͲ͸). It is also fundamentally relational, a point 
which Bottoms & Tankebe stress in their dialogic approach, which sees legitimacy as an ǲiterative process of claim and responseǳ ȋʹͲͳʹ: ͳʹͻȌ. 
As a political scientist, Beethamǯs own work on legitimacy concerns relations of political 
power within societies: it is not directly concerned with the legitimacy of organisations. 
However, many of the same ideas can be found in the organisational studies literature, 
where there is a wealth of research on the theme of organisational legitimacy. It is well 
beyond the scope of this article to review that literature here, but for present purposes    
the following is helpful:  
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An organization is said to be legitimate to the extent that its means and ends 
appear to conform with social norms, values, and expectations (Ashforth & Gibbs 
1990: 177). 
According to this view, a Ǯlegitimate organisationǯ is one that is perceived to be pursuing 
socially acceptable goals in a socially acceptable way: the importance of this normative 
dimension means that efficiency and performance alone are not sufficient to confer 
legitimacy on an organisation (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990). Legitimacy is, however, always 
problematic, because social norms and values are often contradictory, ambiguous or 
unclear – but also because organisations are sometimes answerable to a number of 
different constituents, who may have conflicting expectations or perceptions. This is sometimes referred to as an organisationǯs Ǯpolyarchic contextǯ ȋZald ͳͻ͹ͺȌ. 
This begs the question: who or what makes up probationǯs polyarchic context? We can 
begin to address this question by considering Rod Morganǯs ȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍ analysis of the main Ǯusersǯ and Ǯbeneficiariesǯ of probation services. Morgan identified four groups of key 
constituents in relation to probation services: the public, offenders and victims, 
ministers and civil servants, and sentencers. We see this as a useful starting point for our analysis. (owever, we depart from Morganǯs framework by introducing a fifth group who we see as a key constituency in probationǯs polyarchic context. This is the 
constituency made up of probation workers and their representatives – trade unions, professional associations and other groups of Ǯexpertsǯ associated with probation work. 
We contend that, as a large part of the population of subjects of the TR reforms, and as 
employees and representatives of the new organisational entities, their importance in 
the reconfigured probation field should not be underestimated. 
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We proceed by considering each of these five main constituencies in turn, starting with 
the public. 
The public 
Morgan made some interesting observations about probationǯs relationship with the 
public that are still of relevance today. He began by observing that the average member of the public could not be considered a Ǯuserǯ of probation services, although they may 
be a beneficiary; hopefully being better protected from victimisation as a result of the 
work probation services do. Furthermore, evidence available at that time suggested that 
most citizens knew very little (if anything) about probation: to the general public probation was arguably little more than ǲpart of the background fabric of the stateǳ ȋMorgan ʹͲͲ͵: ͻȌ. The public, Morgan continued, did not relate to Ǯprobationǯ in the 
ways that they related to the police, whom they were much more likely to have had 
some direct contact with (e.g. as witnesses to or victims of crime). The same could be 
said for other services like education and health, with which citizens regularly interact. With Morganǯs comments in mind, can it be said that the general public has any 
particular expectations, norms or values in respect of the means or ends of probation 
work?  
In his work on the rise of the private security sector, White (2010) has argued that there 
exists in civil society a generalised norm or sensibility around the provision of security 
as something that should be monopolised by the state and, in particular, the public 
police service. Given this deep-seated political norm, White observes that the private 
security industry has struggled for legitimacy: the very idea of private security and the 
interference of commercial interests in the provision of security for citizens offends 
against this general sensibility, and creates a cultural resistance to the security market 
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and those who wish to enter it. Of course, Morganǯs observation that probation is generally perceived as part of the Ǯbackground fabric of the stateǯ – and presumably also 
as part of a criminal justice system - could suggest some generalised expectation on the 
part of the public that probation services are or should be delivered by the state, and it 
could follow therefore that the contracting out of probation services might offend a social norm around criminal justice as rightful state territory. (owever, given Morganǯs observations about the publicǯs very different relationships with (and awareness of) 
police and probation services, we should exercise caution in pushing this argument too 
far.  
That said, the public were not absent from the governmentǯs TR rhetoric. Values of Ǯpublic interestǯ and Ǯpublic protectionǯ featured heavily in TR policy documents, and 
appear to have been central concerns in demarcating the separate territories of the new 
NPS and the CRCs. In other words, in the specification for the new architecture of 
probation services, these values were invoked to explain what areas of probation work 
would remain with the public sector arm of probation, and thus fall outside the scope of the CRCs. So, in the interests of Ǯpublic protectionǯ, it was made very clear that the NPS 
would assume responsibility for the supervision of offenders assessed as posing the 
highest levels of risk of serious harm to the publiciii:  
We will not take any risks in protecting the public and the public sector 
Probation Service will retain ultimate responsibility for public protection […] 
The Probation Service performs a vital role in protecting the public and 
managing risk – I am determined to preserve that (Grayling 2013: 6). 
It was also made clear that those aspects of probation work involving decisions made in 
the public interest – about the allocation and/or duration of punishment - would be 
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retained in the public sector. Thus, probation work in the courts (including the 
provision of pre-sentence reports and the enforcement/prosecutorial role) and the 
provision of reports to the Parole Board were designated as roles for public probation, 
thus avoiding the introduction of commercial interests at important decision points.  
Despite low public awareness of the reconfiguration (and part-privatisation) of 
probation services under TR, then, both Government rhetoric and the design of the new architecture for probation services communicated a strong message about Ǯrightfulǯ remit of the state in the delivery of probation services, and a Ǯguardianshipǯ role for the 
state in demarcating the acceptable territories of the CRCs. However, it is difficult to find 
support for the idea that the public recognise themselves as stakeholders in probation 
work, let alone that they have particular views about how, or by whom, such work 
should be conducted. All that we can safely say about the values and expectations that 
the public bring to probation work in general and to CRCs in particular are somewhat 
opaque.  
Offenders and victims 
Morgan (2003) had little to say about victims, except to comment that although the 
provision of some specific services to victims had been assumed by the probation 
service since the early 1990s, they could not be regarded as a core constituency at that 
time. Under Transforming Rehabilitation, victim services is one of the areas of work 
which was reserved for the public sector NPS, although CRCs are contractually required 
to support the NPS as required in the implementation of the Victim Contact scheme 
(MoJ 2013c). The allocation of victim services to the NPS is justified on the basis that having one organisation responsible for the scheme ǲis in the best interests of the victimǳ 
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(MoJ 2013c: 7). Clearly the idea that a single organisation should also be responsible for 
the supervision of offenders met with a different conclusion. 
Turning to offenders, Morgan (2003) argued that, whilst they could and should not be regarded as the Ǯcustomersǯ of the probation service ȋbecause of the involuntary nature 
of their engagement), they were nonetheless an important constituency, having (in 
contrast to the general public) direct dealings with it and thus being in a position to hold 
informed views about the quality of probation services and their staff. A body of recent research on offendersǯ experiences of probation supervision has increased our knowledge of what offenders do ȋand donǯtȌ value in their interactions with probation, 
and this in turn informs our understanding of how offenders evaluate the legitimacy of 
probation services (e.g. see Shapland et al 2012: 12-15). 
One thing we know from this body of research is that those under supervision value 
continuity in terms of having the opportunity to build a relationship with a supervisor. 
This emphasis on the relational aspect of probation supervision, and the importance of 
continuity to compliance and cooperation, was recognised in the Offender Engagement 
Programme (OEP) launched by NOMS in 2010 (Rex 2012). Paradoxically, one of the 
immediate effects of the TR programme which succeeded it (and arguably brought the 
OEP to a premature close) was the rupture of some supervisory relationships, where probationers found that Ǯtheirǯ supervisor had been allocated to a part of the new 
organisational structure, whilst they had been assigned to another. This was an issue 
which practitioners in our case study of the transition of staff from one probation Trust 
to a CRC reflected on in the immediate aftermath of the reorganisation (Robinson et al. 
2016). Several participants in the study talked, in interview, about the pains of 
separation from service users with whom they had built good working relationships but 
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who were now in the process of being transferred to the NPS due to their Ǯhigh riskǯ 
status. In another study, which involved interviews with offenders subject to intensive 
probation supervision, Kay (2016) found that the initial implementation of TR 
presented the potential for considerable barriers to compliance and longer-term 
desistance for some of the probationers in his sample.  
Meanwhile, HM Inspectorate of Probation found that the extent to which attention had 
been paid to helping service users make the transition from Trust to NPS or CRC varied 
between the four areas they inspected in April-May 2014 (HMIP 2015a). In one area 
leaflets had been drawn up and letters sent to all affected service users to explain the 
process; elsewhere the emphasis was on trying to arrange three-way meetings to hand 
over supervision – though there was not always time to accomplish this. Between them, 
the areas estimated that about one third of service users would experience a change of 
supervisor as a result of TR (HMIP 2015a: 16). Consistent with this suggestion, a survey 
of 251 service users carried out by User Voice for the National Audit Office in 2015 
revealed that a third of respondents appeared not to know which organisation was 
managing their supervision, and more than 40% reported that they had experienced at 
least one change of supervisor (User Voice 2015)iv. 
Of course, any initial Ǯpains of separationǯ will inevitably diminish over time, and many 
of those made subject to probation supervision post-2014 may have no prior experience on which to draw.  (owever, many of probationǯs Ǯinvoluntary clientsǯ are repeat users 
of probation services, and may well question why it is that they are reporting to a CRC, 
or why the author of their pre-sentence report is not subsequently able to supervise 
them because they work in a different organisation altogether. Under the terms of their 
contracts, CRCs are required to elicit feedback from service users every 6 months via a 
12 
 
standardised questionnaire, and results at the end of 2015 indicate variations in levels 
of satisfaction across CRCs, from 70% to 88% (NOMS 2016). This will form a useful 
baseline for future comparison. 
Clearly, offenders and victims are more prominent stakeholders than the general public 
as far as probation services are concerned, in that they experience these services 
directly and their experiences will likely shape their legitimacy evaluations. From the 
perspective of CRCs, this is important because positive experiences are more likely to 
create the conditions for genuine engagement with probation services and, in turn, 
enhance the likelihood of positive outcomes in terms of reduced reoffending. As we 
shall see in the following section, the stakes are high for CRCs when it comes to outcomes for offenders. The Ǯsuccessǯ or Ǯfailureǯ of those individuals on supervision will 
dictate the level of payments received and ultimately the survival of CRCs and their 
current owners in the new contractual environment.  
Ministers and civil servants 
Morganǯs ȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍ article was written prior to the creation of the Ministry of Justice or 
the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), so there are aspects of his 
commentary which are somewhat outdated. Nonetheless, his observation that ministers and civil servants ǲexercise some commandǳ over probation services (2003: 9), 
particularly in respect of the setting of budgets and priorities, remains relevant today.  
Responsibility for the reconfiguration of probation services ultimately lies with 
ministers, most notably Chris Grayling, who as Secretary of State for Justice from 
September 2012 to May 2015 saw the process of TR through. It was NOMS (as an 
executive agency of the Ministry) which managed the competition and which 
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subsequently let and now manages the CRC contracts (NAO 2016). The process of 
procurement of CRC providers began in May 2013 and contracts were signed in 
February 2015. The procurement process was, according to the NAO, ǲhighly challengingǳ, not least because the CRCs were new entities with limited track records 
and available data, and some of the potential providers were new to the sector (2016: 
18). Initially more than 700 organisations from the private, public and third sectors had registered an interest, suggesting success in respect of the Ministryǯs objective to create 
a market for probation services. Ultimately, however, contracts were awarded to just 
eight providers, albeit reportedly with a view to ensuring that none captured more than 
25% of the market (NAO 2016)v. As previously noted, only one CRC was won by a 
contractor outside the private sector. 
Although this process attracted little media attention, ministers from non-Coalition 
parties did raise some concerns. For example, in comments to the Guardian in May 2014 
the then Shadow Justice Minister Sadiq Khan (cited in Strickland 2016: 7) described the Governmentǯs actions as Ǯundemocraticǯ: most notably because of a clause in the CRC 
contract which made it almost impossible for a new government to reverse the policy 
without incurring significant financial costs.  
Subsequently, a debate in Parliament on 28 October 2015 aired concerns about the 
perceived risks associated with a fragmented probation service, to which Andrew 
Selous (then Minister for Prisons, Probation and Rehabilitation) responded: 
We have very robust contract management for every CRC and will hold them to 
account on what they have said they will do (cited in Strickland 2016: 17). 
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This is a telling retort, in that it clearly exposes the Governmentǯs approach to 
legitimacy: CRCs now exist and operate within a regulatory framework which in other contexts has been described as Ǯanchored pluralismǯ ȋLoader & Walker ʹͲͲ͸Ȍ. According 
to this model, the existence of multiple providers is legitimated by central (state) 
control of regulation. In the case of CRCs, their legitimacy, from the perspectives of 
Government ministers and civil servants, derives from their ability to deliver on a 
common framework of contractual obligations, and reward structures are closely 
aligned with performance against these measures. As the NAO (2016) explains, the 
payment structure for CRCs has three elements: a fee for service (for the satisfactory 
delivery of statutory activities); a fee for use (which covers work done for other parties, 
e.g. where the NPS commissions CRCs to provide services for its own higher-risk 
offenders)vi; and payment by results (to be triggered if CRCs achieve specific, measurable 
reductions in reoffending after 2 years).  
Although initially planned to be a larger proportion of projected CRC income, the 
payment by results element represents only about 10% of total predicted payments. As 
the NAO (2016) point out, this potentially places more of an emphasis on meeting the 
performance targets – so-called Ǯservice levelsǯ – specified in the fee for service part of 
the contractvii. This emphasis on service levels is further emphasised by the risk of Ǯservice credit deductionsǯ which can penalise under-performance to a maximum of 15% ȋNAO ʹͲͳ͸: ʹ͵Ȍ. Thus, ǲthe design of the fee for service is more significant in incentivising the right behavioursǳ ȋNAO ʹͲͳ͸: ʹ͵Ȍ, and in this context the Ǯrightǯ 
behaviours have been constructed along very specific lines. To put this another way, the 
legitimacy of CRCs will be judged by ministers and civil servants with reference to very specific expectations around their performance: the timeliness, completion and Ǯqualityǯ 
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of delivery of statutory requirements first and foremost, and (only secondarily) the 
achievement of rehabilitative outcomes.  
Sentencers 
Morganǯs ȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍ analysis identified sentencers as the principal Ǯcommissonersǯ of probation services and probationǯs key constituency. Arguably this remains true today, 
despite all the intervening changes: in the absence of demand for probation services 
from the courts, probation services would be obsolete. It is therefore important to 
understand what sentencers expect from and value about probation services if demand 
is to be maintained, and it is equally important to ensure that sentencers have a good 
knowledge of what probation services are offering. Robinson (2011) has referred to probationǯs work in courts as the Ǯshop windowǯ for probation services: it is here that ǲthe available penal product rangeǳ is most obviously on display ȋMorgan ʹͲͲ͵: ͳͲȌ and 
it is in the courts that information about what probation services are and how they are 
delivered can be communicated. Throughout their history, probation services have 
sought to cultivate relationships of trust with sentencers, and in the context of court 
work, the iterative, dialogic process of legitimation described by Bottoms & Tankebe 
(2012) was played out.  
Unfortunately, we know little about sentencersǯ views of private sector provision ȋAllen 
2013), or how judges and magistrates might feel about passing community sentences in the Ǯreconfigured fieldǯ of probation. What we do know, however, is that the new 
architecture of probation services has ruptured the relationship between sentencers 
and the main providers of probation services. This is because CRC staff are excluded 
from direct work in and with the courts, which is the preserve of the NPS (Robinson et 
al. 2016). At best, this will serve to restrict sentencersǯ knowledge of the people and the 
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services involved in the supervision of community sentences (and post-custodial 
supervision) and, at worst, it may reduce their confidence in the delivery of such 
sentences. Indeed, in his evidence to the (ouse of Commons Justice Committeeǯs ʹͲͳ͵ inquiry into the Governmentǯs Transforming Rehabilitation proposals, the Deputy Chair of the Magistratesǯ Association commented that:  
The main risk is one of trust and confidence. Sentencers […] need to build a 
relationship – which we have done with the Probation Service – both inside and 
outside the court, and that does not happen overnight. (Monkhouse, cited in 
House of Commons Justice Committee 2014: 8). 
These concerns need to be considered in light of a decline in the use of community 
sentences that stretches back a decade to 2006, and a 7% drop in new community 
orders commencing in the 12 months to September 2014 (Ministry of Justice 2015).   
Sentencers, then, continue to be an extremely important constituency as far as 
probation work is concerned, and CRCs ought to pay serious attention to potential 
means of cultivating meaningful communication and relationships with sentencers in 
their area, as well as with the NPS staff who represent them in court contexts. 
Probation workers and their representatives 
Transforming Rehabilitation is not the first set of probation Ǯreformsǯ ever to prompt 
significant internal disquiet or challenge from within probation ranks. When in the mid-
1990s the then Home Secretary, Michael Howard, declared his intention to sever 
probation training from its social work roots, there was considerable opposition from 
within probation and a lively normative debate ensued in the academic literature centred on Ǯprobation valuesǯ and the potential consequences of probationǯs 
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independence from the social work profession (e.g. Nellis 1995; James 1995). The 1990s 
also saw strong probation opposition to electronic monitoring, the surveillant function 
of which was seen as incompatible with the serviceǯs traditional values around 
promoting change and rehabilitationviii. More recently, changing representations of 
community service work – specifically its transformation from a socially beneficial, 
reparative activity to a punitive sanction - have met with negative commentary; as did 
the contracting out (to Serco) of community service work in London in 2012 (Harding 
2013).  
With such a history, the spectre of partial privatisation as part of the TR reforms was an 
obvious normative bone of contention for the probation service and its supporters, and it was this issue which was most prominent in the national campaign to Ǯkeep probation publicǯ which was launched by trades unions representing probation staff in January 
2013. The early months of this campaign coincided with news that two major private 
companies – G4S and Serco – had been overcharging the Ministry of Justice on their 
contracts for electronic monitoring, had been forced to pay back £20 million, and were 
being investigated by the Serious Fraud Office (Chambers 2014; NAO 2016). This of course came hot on the heels of GͶSǯs failure to provide sufficient security at the ʹͲͳʹ 
London Olympics. Not surprisingly, supporters of probation were keen to keep this Ǯmoral taintǯ away from other probation services, as was the Ministry of Justice, which 
had little choice but to ban both companies from the TR competition in late 2013. The 
MoJ was also keen to stress the involvement of the voluntary sector in bids for 
probation contracts, and made resources available to enable probation staff to develop 
bids from probation staff mutuals. These steps did little, however, to quieten doubts 
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about the motivations and potential trustworthiness of other potential private actors 
seeking to enter the probation field.  
Nor did it help that the TR agenda was roundly perceived within the service as 
ideologically driven rather than evidence based. Although senior probation leaders 
were reportedly banned by NOMS from voicing concerns about government policyix, 
academic commentators sympathetic to probation were quick to argue that the more 
positive objectives of the TR programme – such as the extension of post-custodial 
supervision to short-term prisoners and the development of a Ǯthrough the gateǯ 
resettlement service – could have been achieved by the existing public sector probation Trusts which, in the MoJǯs own assessment, were performing very well in the run-up to 
TR (e.g. Senior 2013). In October 2013, members of the Trade Union and Professional 
Association for probation workers (Napo) voted overwhelmingly in favour of strike action, for only the third time in the organisationǯs ͳͲͳ-year historyx. Napoǯs General 
Secretary Ian Lawrence said of this move: 
Napo does not take strike action lightly, but we strongly believe that decimating 
the award-winning public sector Probation Service and selling it off to the likes 
of G4S and Serco will result in increased re-offending rates, a lack of continuity in 
risk management, and will see the privateers making huge profits at the expense 
of victims, offenders and taxpayers (quoted in the Independent, 18 October 
2013).xi 
Both Lawrenceǯs statement and the history of probationǯs dissent from Government 
policy reveal something important about professional values in the probation context, 
which is that they centre on both the means and the ends of probation work. Indeed, research on how probation workers construct Ǯqualityǯ in their practice has 
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demonstrated that they care about how the work is done; that it is done by Ǯthe right kind of peopleǯ; and that it is done in the interests of offender rehabilitation and public 
protection (see Robinson and McNeill 2004; Deering & Feilzer ʹͲͳͷȌ.  Lawrenceǯs 
statement indicates concerns about Ǯthe wrong kind of peopleǯ entering the profession; about the reorientation of the Ǯendsǯ of probation work to the pursuit of profit and 
interests of shareholders; and (relatedly) the potential of outcomes that are antithetical 
to rehabilitation and could increase risks to the public.  
Napo and its sister trades unions went further than raising normative concerns around 
TR, however: in fact, they sought on more than one occasion to challenge the legal 
legitimacy of aspects of TR. Firstly, in February 2014, UNISON, Napo and the GMB 
reported the UK Government to the International Labour Organisation, claiming that its 
plans to outsource unpaid work to private sector companies would be in breach of the )LOǯs Forced Labour Conventionxii. Subsequently, in October 2014, Napo challenged the legal legitimacy of the Secretary of Stateǯs plans to contract out the CRCsxiii. Napoǯs 
application for a Judicial Review had two strands: a public law strand centred on the Governmentǯs failure to publish evidence that it was safe to proceed to share sale; and a 
private law strand related to a lack of duty of care by the employer to ensure the safety 
of staff, service users and the public. Although this legal action was concluded in 
December 2014 when the Secretary of State for Justice agreed to provide details of the steps planned to address Napoǯs concerns, subsequent news about under-performance 
of some CRCs (HMIP 2016b) in mid-2016 fuelled further criticism from Napoxiv.    
The problem of consent  
If, as Beetham (1991) argues, legitimate authority requires the consent of its subjects, 
and if it is agreed that CRC staff can be conceived as subjects of TR, then there can be 
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little doubt that CRCs, as new organisational entities, started out with a legitimacy 
deficit from the perspective of their employees. In our case study, not only did the vast 
majority of probation staff employed in the probation Trusts fundamentally disagree with the proposal to split the service, seeing it as an Ǯunwanted divorceǯ ȋRobinson et al. 
2016), but they also took issue with the process whereby staff were allocated between 
the two new structures (see also Deering & Feilzer 2015). Although staff were invited to 
express a preference for a post in either the new NPS or the CRC, allocation decisions 
were made by senior managers and centred on an analysis of the risk profile of individual practitionersǯ caseloads on a randomly chosen date in late ʹͲͳ͵.  
There is a large body of research which indicates the value of procedural justice in peopleǯs normative judgements about the exercise of authority (e.g. Tyler 1990; see also 
Bottoms & Tankebe 2012: 145). The concept of procedural justice includes 
consideration of the quality of decision-making, incorporating matters such as allowing 
people to have a say in decisions that affect them and the consistency of decision-
making in similar cases. In our case study, we interviewed several individuals who had 
chosen the National Probation Service but been allocated to the CRC, who felt that they 
had been dealt with unfairly and/or not listened to, and that they had ended up in the Ǯwrongǯ organisation. Some staff, thus, felt an element of coercion in their allocation to 
the CRC – which is significantly at odds with the idea that legitimate authority requires 
the consent of its subjects (Beetham 1991). In our case study area we encountered a 
number of probation officer grade staff who had been allocated to the CRC but who 
subsequently applied for and obtained positions in the National Probation Service. 
The frustrations of many staff who experienced the splitting of their former 
organisation were captured in an anonymous letter by a probation officer which 
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appeared in a special edition of the British Journal of Community Justice prior to the 
split: 
)n the next few weeks we will be Ǯautomatically assignedǯ to a new role. This, in 
my opinion, will either be as an automaton, inputting data, regimented risk 
assessment, adherence to a plethora of targets and processes, onto new 
computer systems as civil servants with no capacity to say, ǮStop, this is not rightǯ. 
Or alternatively, I will be assigned to an, as yet unknown, organisation that cares 
only to maximise shareholder profits. My esteemed colleagues and I are being 
treated as commodities, our clients as commodities, not for the public good but 
for shareholder profit maximisation (Anon 2013: 206).  
Consistent with the serviceǯs history of opposition to privatisation, and the views 
expressed by the anonymous PO quoted above, many of the interviewees in the case 
study area – though by no means all – also expressed grave concerns about the prospect that Ǯtheirǯ CRC might be destined for private ownership well before this became a 
reality for the new organisation. Some explicitly voiced objections to the idea of probation for profit or the Ǯcommodificationǯ of probation work ȋMcCulloch & McNeill 
2007), which they feared was wrong in principle and/or likely to mean cuts to 
resources and the result of a poorer quality service to offenders and the public. 
Concerns about commodification were exacerbated for some during the research when senior managers began the process of designing the required Ǯrate cardsǯ for the pricing 
and packaging of CRC services for sale to the NPS mentioned above. In the words of one 
very experienced probation officer, ǲ)tǯs not supposed to make a profit, is it?ǳ. This is an 
expression of what has been termed ideological proletarianization (Derber 1982): that is, the workerǯs loss of control over the purposes or ends to which his or her work is put.  
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This probation officer was not alone in her objection to the potential reorientation of 
her work toward economic ends and in favour of company shareholders, rather than (or as well asȌ the Ǯtraditionalǯ beneficiaries of probation work: offenders and the public. 
Nor was she alone in worrying about the potential barriers to legitimacy in the eyes of 
existing statutory and non-statutory partner agencies that the future privatisation of the 
CRC could presentxv. Conscious that the new organisation in which they were now working had been stripped of its Ǯprobationǯ label, many worried that its acquisition by 
a private company might bring a new moral taint to its identity, thereby exacerbating the CRCǯs  struggle to win recognition and gain a legitimate foothold in an already 
crowded and complex criminal justice field (see also Robinson et al. 2016).  
ǮMaking a differenceǯ and the promise of innovation 
Some of the interviewees in our case study area were however relatively unconcerned 
about the prospect of private ownership, and even cautiously optimistic that it might enhance the organisationǯs effectiveness ȋsee Robinson et al. 2016; Burke et al. 2016). These staff placed a higher normative value on doing the job and Ǯmaking a differenceǯ in 
the lives of offenders than on other values around public service, and they felt energised 
by the prospects of improved IT systems, the relaxation of national standards and a 
renewed emphasis on rehabilitation. As one middle manager in our study expressed it: 
The reason I find this change exciting is because the system that I loved and always wanted to be a part of, ) found stifling. )ǯve always felt like )ǯm working with shackles on, that itǯs so rigid and itǯs so prescribed, and it didnǯt allow for me, as an individual who has … )ǯm an ideas kind of person; creative ideas and creative ways of working, which the probation system didnǯt allow for. Basically, TR goes, ǲletǯs just cut those chains off youǳ. 
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These and similar comments were made in the early months of the CRCǯs operation, 
prior to share sale and the knowledge of who the new owners would be. Some two 
years on, however, they need to be read in the context of emerging knowledge about 
how CRCs have actually been operating. Much of what we know about the national 
picture of the reconfigured probation field, and the performance of CRCs, comes from 
the work of HM Inspectorate of Probation, and in particular the series of five reports on 
the early implementation of TR (HMIP 2015b, 2015c, 2015d; 2016a; 2016b). All of these 
reports have been quite critical of the work of CRCs in their first two years, and do not, 
collectively, suggest that there has been much emphasis on innovative approaches. 
Other valuable evidence about the operation of CRCs in their first two years is provided 
by the National Audit Office (2016). Its report considers, among other issues, how the 
performance of CRCs may have been shaped by the new regulatory mechanisms and fee 
structures discussed above. As the reportǯs authors point out, because the fee structures 
in the CRC contracts place such a major emphasis on meeting Ǯservice levelsǯ ȋi.e. 
quantitative performance targets), they limit the incentive on providers to focus on 
innovation/outcomes, which are rewarded by the (much smaller) PbR element. The 
NAO report offers an example from Warwickshire & West Mercia, where the former 
probation Trust and the new CRC (in its early months) had shifted their activities away 
from the delivery of established accredited programmes and moved toward the 
provision of more vocational services which it proposed would be more effective for 
most types of offender. The NAO reports that: 
under the fee for service the CRC will lose £1.4 million of the payment it would 
have received for delivering accredited programmes, and will not recover the 
£1.1 million it had planned to spend on vocational rehabilitation (NAO 2016: 24). 
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This finding reflects our own research in a different CRC, where the Trustǯs recent and 
very enthusiastic development of non-programmatic desistance-based practices had to 
be abandoned in the context of the turmoil generated by TR, leaving staff to hope that 
the new owners would ultimately enable them to reinstate these. In light of the 
Warwickshire & West Mercia example, it seems likely that these staff will be 
disappointed. Somewhat perversely, then, it seems that CRCs may in practice be less likely and less Ǯfreeǯ to innovate in the pursuit of effectiveness than their predecessors 
(the Trusts) were. 
The NAO report also reveals the very important fact that CRCs are experiencing 
significantly lower volumes of cases than was anticipated when their bids were being 
prepared. For a variety of reasons, volumes are reportedly down by between 6% and 36% against projected figures, and this may impact on the extent and pace of CRCsǯ plans for 
transforming their services, including plans for innovation (NAO 2016: 43-45). It may 
also of course trigger staff redundancies, which have already been experienced in some 
CRCs.xvi 
Conclusion: a complex dynamic 
In this article we have introduced a framework for thinking about legitimacy in the 
probation context and sought to apply it to the contemporary issue of privatised 
probation services. Our framework emphasises the subjective nature of legitimacy and 
the multiplicity of stakeholders whose evaluations may be considered important. We 
have argued that, for privatised probation services (CRCs), the pursuit of legitimacy is 
complicated by virtue of their particular polyarchic context (Zald 1978): unlike most 
commercial firms, which have a product to sell to identifiable customers whose 
demands or needs can be reasonably easily ascertained, CRCs have multiple 
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constituencies to satisfy. These constituencies bring their own norms, values and 
expectations to bear on the evaluation of CRCsǯ legitimacy and, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
these do not necessarily map neatly onto one another. Furthermore, as we have 
endeavoured to demonstrate, we know rather more about the norms, values and 
expectations of some audiences than we do about others. For example, despite their importance as stakeholders, we currently know almost nothing about sentencersǯ 
perspectives on the legitimacy of CRCs; nor about whether or how these may be 
impacting on sentencing behaviour.  
We have also shown that all constituencies are not equal, either in terms of the potential 
power of their legitimacy evaluations, or the precise implications (for CRCs) of their 
unfavourable judgements. Our analysis has highlighted the particular importance, for 
CRCs, of the expectations embedded in their contracts with NOMS. When these are not 
met, income is reduced, with potentially difficult consequences. However, CRCs should 
avoid focusing all their attention on this audience. We have argued that probation 
workers should be considered as a key constituency in probationǯs polyarchic context: 
their buy-in is key if CRCs are to retain a skilled and experienced workforce and wish to 
enhance their ability to deliver the sorts of services that offenders say they appreciate. We have also argued that the moral obligation to help improve offendersǯ lives which 
has animated probation work throughout its history is now sharpened by a new 
instrumental imperative to deliver profits for shareholders.  
All new organisations arguably face challenges in terms of establishing or building their 
legitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990; Suchman 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002) and, as 
new entities in the probation field, Community Rehabilitation Companies are no 
exception. They must grapple with the Ǯliability of newnessǯ ȋStinchcombe ͳͻ͸ͷȌ, but 
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also the liabilities associated with replacing an existing organisational entity with a long 
history, an established reputation and a loyal workforce. On the basis of the foregoing 
analysis, it is clear that CRCs have legitimation work to do. We know little, however, 
about the extent to which CRCs and their senior representatives may be aware of the 
legitimacy deficits they face, or the complex dynamics likely to be involved in its 
cultivation with different audiences.  
An important conclusion to draw from our analysis is that the legitimacy challenges 
faced by CRCs are likely to fluctuate over time, as well as between constituencies. For 
example, the effects of severing some supervisory relationships when staff and 
offenders were allocated between the new NPS and CRCs  will now have subsided 
significantly, as will the intense dissatisfaction of some CRC staff who have now found 
jobs in the public sector NPS. By the same token, the passage of time will likely 
introduce new legitimacy issues, as the new owners bed in and implement their own 
particular changes. At the time of writing, CRCs are a little over two years old, and their 
new owners have been in place for almost eighteen months. To date, information about how the eight different owners are approaching the task of managing Ǯtheirǯ CRCs is 
very limited; although one (Sodexo Justice Services which, with 6 CRCs, won the largest 
number of contracts) has already attracted considerable negative publicity for making 
immediate redundancies, introducing open-plan reporting centres and proposing to 
replace probation staff with kiosks that allow offenders to check-in electronically 
(Raynor & Vanstone 2015; Leftly 2016). It is, we think, particularly likely that probation 
workers and their representatives, and potentially sentencers, as well as ministers and 
civil servants, will begin to differentiate between CRCs as they accrue more direct and 
indirect experience of their practices, cultures and performance. 
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i CRCs operated as companies in public ownership for eight months, whilst bids to run 
them from a range of potential providers were scrutinised. On 1 February 2015 they 
transferred to eight providers under contracts worth around £3.7 billion over 7 years.  
They include Sodexo Justice Services (winning contracts for 6 CRCs) and Purple Futures, 
an Interserve-led partnership, winning 5 contracts. Durham Tees Valley is the only CRC 
not under private ownership (see NAO 2016). 
 
ii Our own recent research examined the experiences of probation staff as they moved 
from one Probation Trust to a new CRC. This ethnographic study began in March 2014 
and finished in June 2015, and involved over 100 individual and focus group interviews 
and approximately 120 hours of observations, engaging staff at every level within the 
new organisation. For more information about the study and its findings in respect of workersǯ identities and probation occupational cultures, see Robinson et al. (2016) and 
Burke et al. (2016). 
 
iii The idea that offenders can be separated into categories of high, medium and low risk and that only the supervision of the former group constitutes Ǯpublic protection workǯ 
has been heavily criticised (e.g. see Robinson 2016). 
 
iv Interviews with CRC and NPS service users carried out by HM Inspectorate of 
Probation as part of its programme of inspections of the early implementation of TR do 
not paint a particularly negative picture – though methodological issues mean that the 
samples interviewed are likely to be weighted towards more cooperative and perhaps 
more satisfied individuals (HMIP 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2016a, 2016b). 
 
v The NAO (2016) report reveals that in the case of 5 CRCs, there was only one 
compliant bid at the final stage of the competition. 
 
vi This has required the agreement of so-called Ǯrate cardsǯ specifying and pricing 
relevant services (NAO 2016). 
 
vii The CRC contracts specify ͳ͹ service levels and ͹ Ǯassurance metricsǯ for monthly 
reporting of performance. Activities are heavily weighted in favour of completion of 
unpaid work, accredited programmes and Rehabilitation Activity Requirements (NAO 
2016: 25; see also NOMS 2016). 
 
viii This opposition paved the way for the subsequent wholesale contracting out of 
electronic monitoring to private companies (Nellis & Bungerfeldt 2013). 
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